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Case and Comment
CONVEYANCING -  EXECUTING DEED -  DELIVERY -  
ESCROW.
The recent case of George v. Cyr1 decided by Mr. Justice 
Bridges raises some interesting problems in the conveyancing 
field. The relevant facts, briefly stated, are as follows:
One C. Beaulieu and three other persons were co-owners 
of property situate in the City of Edmundston. On July 27, 1955, 
instructions were given by them to their solicitor to prepare a 
deed from them as grantors to Cyr as grantee. Beaulieu signed 
and sealed the deed on August 1, 1955, the other grantors doing 
likewise on July 27, August 1 and August 10. On August 15, 
George recovered a judgment against Beaulieu, and issued an 
execution thereon on the same day, placing it in the hands of the 
sheriff. The latter seized Bealieu’s interest in the property on 
August 18, wrhich he sold at auction on August 25 for $50.00. 
(This amount seems unjustifiably low, considering that the mar­
ket value of the interest was something in excess of $2,000.) 
The interest ultimately came into the hands of George. After 
Beaulieu signed the deed it was left with the solicitor. The 
purchase price had not been paid nor had all the parties signed. 
It was contended by the defendant that Beaulieu delivered the 
deed on August 1. If such were the case, he had no interest for 
the sheriff to seize. If not, when the execution was handed to 
the sheriff the property interest of Bealieu became bound under 
section 5 of the Memorials and Execution Act.2
In order to effect the transfer of property by deed, three 
requisites are essential: signing, sfcaling and delivering. The 
first two of these are what might be called the physical acts of 
execution. On the facts as set out above die question of delivery 
only arises.
Some general comments as to what constitutes delivery, and 
how it is effected, would, no doubt, first be in order. How 
important is this mythical thing styled delivery (in its technical 
sense)? The answer to this question is best illustrated by the 
following statement:
“After a deed is w ritten and sealed, if it be not delivered,
all the rest is to no purpose.”
Thus it can be concluded if a deed be not delivered, it cannot 
be operative as a conveyancing instrument.
In ordinary parlance the expression “delivery of a deed”, 
would admit of only one interpretation, namely, the giving or
1. Unreported.
2. R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 143.
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the handing over of the instrument to some other person. In 
the legal technical sense, as this expression is used in convey­
ancing law, physical action is immaterial. As used in this latter 
sense, the term delivery, would seem, on the authorities to mean 
the intention of the grantor, as evidence by words or actions, to 
divest himself of control over, but not necessarily possession of 
the property described in the instrument, and to be immediately 
bound thereby. The principle has become firmly entrenched in 
our law that physical delivery is not only not necessary, but even 
if the grantor retains possession of the deed, or subsequently 
destroys it without it ever having been seen by the grantee, the 
transfer is still effectual.3 Blackburn, J., in Xenos v. Wickham, 
said:4
“no particular technical form of words or acts is neces­
sary to render an instrument the deed of the party sealing 
it. The mere affixing of the seal does not render it a 
deed; but as soon as there are acts or words sufficient 
to show that it is intended by the party to be executed  
as his deed presently binding on him, it is sufficient.”
The proposition that intention is the dominant element in ascer­
taining whether or not there has been delivery' has been ac­
cepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in The Trust and Loan 
Company of Upper Canada v. Ruttan.5 This aspect of the exe­
cution of a deed has been most admirably summarized by Rose, 
J. in Re Metropolitan Theatres Ltd.,6 as follows;
“In order that a deed shall be effective it must be ‘de­
livered’, that is to say, the party whose deed the docu­
ment is expressed to be, having first sealed it, must by 
words or conduct expressly ox* impliedly acknowledge 
his intention to be immediately and unconditionally 
bound by the expressions contained therein. While he 
need not part with the posses ?ion of the document he 
must intend to be bound by it.”
In Foundling Hospital v. Crane,7 Farwell, S. J. said:
“There are two sorts of delivery, and two only known 
to the law, one absolute, and the other conditional that 
is an escrow to be the deed of the party when, and if, 
certain conditions are performed. If the deed operated  
is a complete delivery, cadit quaestro; if it did not then 
it must be either an escrow or a nullity.”
In view of the facts and the decision in the case, the word nullity 
must be taken as including a deed given to a third party to hold 
for the convenience of ¡he grantor.
3. Zivicher v. Zivicher, 29 S.C.R. 527.
Thomas v. Thomas, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 202 (N.B.).
4. Xenos v. Wickham, L.R.Q.H.L. 296 at 312.
5. 1 S.C.R. 564.
6. (1917) 40 O.L.R. 345 at p. 347.
7. [1911] 2 K.B. 367 at 377.
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If it had been decided that there was an unconditional de­
livery by Beaulieu at the time he signed and sealed the deed, 
there could be no further discussion. If such had been the case, 
he would have had no interest for the sheriff to seize under the 
execution. He would have had nothing further to say with 
regard to the property. As was said by Hall, J. in Edwards v. 
Poirier,8 “. . . . and it must follow that upon unconditional de­
livery the grantor lost all authority”. It is beyond question that 
Beaulieu ever intended to be irrevocably bound at the time he 
signed the instrument
Was there here a delivery of the deed as an escrow? Before 
considering this possibility, it should first be ascertained what 
constitutes an escrow, and what is necessary to create it. This 
can best be answered in the words of Gwynne, J. in O’Conner 
v. Beaty:9
“. . . . no form of words is necessary to constitute a 
delivery as an escrow, but that all facts attending the 
execution are to be looked at, and that if it can reason­
ably be inferred from those facts that the instruments 
were not intended to take effect as deeds until a certain  
condition should be fulfilled and were delivered upon 
such an agreem ent, the delivery would only operate as 
an escrow .”
It was thought at one time that in order for the delivery to 
operate as an escrow, the instrument must be delivered to a third 
party and not to the grantee or his agent. Indeed, it was so 
field in the New Brunswick case of Haggerty v. O’Leary.10 This 
case must now be treated as overruled on this point by the re­
marks of Strong, J. in Confederation Life Assurance of Canada 
v. O’Donnell.11 The fact that in the case under discussion the 
deed was in the possession of the agent of both parties will not 
disentitle it to be considered an escrow. If Beaulieu had de­
livered the deed to his solicitor as an escrow, and the condition 
under whiah it was so delivered, was subsequently performed, it 
is noe clear that the operative effect of the deed would date back 
to the time of the original delivery.12 If such were the case, 
Beaulieu would again have no interest which could be bound 
by the execution. The learned trial judge stated that in his 
opinion there was no escrow. Looking at the facts, it would be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible to ascertain what particular
8. [1949] 1 D.L.R. 864 (N.S.) at 867.
9. 27 U.C.C.P. 203 at p. 205.
10. 11 N.B.R. 360
11. 13 S.C.R. 218 at p. 222.
12. Edmunds ▼. Edmunds (1904), p. 362. 
Herbert v. Galilen, 3 M.P.R. 67 (N.B.).
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condition must be met to make the instrument operative as an 
escrow. At the time Beaulieu signed the deed the whole tran­
saction was in a state of incompleteness. Thus, one has no 
alternative but to agree with the decision of the court in this 
regard.
The fact that the transaction was incomplete in many re­
spects, tends to show that a complete contract had not been 
finalized. It is apparen on a dose reading of Dillaboudh v. 
McLeod13 and Thomas v. Thomas14 that the courts a~e loath to 
conclude that a delivery was intended where there is no com­
plete contract. When Beaulieu signed the instrument, one of 
the other parties had not signed, nor does it appear that the final 
price had Deen agreed upon. On the basis of this, it could only 
oe concluded that Beaulieu signed the instrument and left it 
with his solicitor for his own convenience, and for the purpose 
of facilitating the finalization of the contract. It can thus be 
stated that the deed here in question comes within the third 
category indicated by Farwell, L. J. in Foundling Hospital v. 
Crane,15 that is, nullity. As explained previously this included 
the present situation.
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